In December 2011, 13 applications under the crisis derogation were received by the Commission, including 3 applications from one country belonging to the so-called ‘blocking minority’ in the Council.

28. Notes that there are still gaps in sectoral and non-market based approaches, and emphasises the need, in particular, to address the production and consumption of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol; notes that there is a need for a comprehensive international approach to non-CO2 climate-relevant anthropogenic emissions, not least because the cost of reducing these emissions is lower than that for the reductions envisaged in the carbon sector, even taking the current carbon price into account; calls for a reform of the project-based mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), whilst avoiding any lock-in to high- ...[+++]carbon infrastructure through the inappropriate use of flexible mechanisms, which would increase the overall cost of efforts to achieve the decarbonisation objective, through the introduction of stringent project-quality standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and reliable, verifiable and real additional emissions reductions that also support sustainable development in developing countries; endorses, moreover, the Commission's view that sectoral mechanisms for economically more advanced developing countries should be agreed for the period beyond 2012, while high-quality CDM should remain available to LDCs; calls for any new international sectoral offset crediting mechanisms to ensure environmental integrity and incorporate climate benefits beyond the 15-30% deviation from business as usual;

12. Calls on WTO members to find an efficient solution as a matter of urgency to paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in order to avoid a deadlock that could derail the whole Doha development round, and to honour the intention of paragraph 6 to ensure that WTO members without adequate manufacturing capacity benefit in full from the provisions of that Declaration, on the same terms as WTO members who do have such capacity; reminds them that to impose new constraints as part of the solution to the paragraph 6 problem would violate the spirit of that Declaration and be justifiably seen by developing coun ...[+++]tries as evidence of bad faith;

11. Calls on WTO members to find a solution as a matter of urgency to paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, in order to avoid a deadlock that could derail the whole Doha development round, and to honour the intention of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration to ensure that WTO members without adequate manufacturing capacity benefit in full from the provisions of that declaration, on the same terms as WTO members who do have such capacity; and reminds them that to impose new constraints as part of the solution to the paragraph 6 problem would violate the spirit of the Doha Declaration and be justifiably seen by developing countries as eviden ...[+++]ce of bad faith;

Lastly, the report mentions progress achieved in implementing the action plan (financial conglomerates, prospectus to be published for securities offered to the public or admitted for trading, market abuse, collateral risk and lending risk) and the remaining problem areas (pension funds and e-commerce).

(6) Whereas, in the context of an economic policy compatible with the Treaty, responsibility for capacity regulation lies primarily with operators in the sector; whereas the cost of the measures introduced should therefore be borne by the undertakings in the inland waterway sector; whereas this capacity regulation consists of laying down the conditions to apply for bringing into service certain new capacity without going so far as totally blocking access to the market; whereas it is possible to limit the duration and impact of thes ...[+++]e conditions and to adjust them flexibly to market trends but the ratios must gradually be reduced to zero within four years starting on 29 April 1999; whereas this regulatory mechanism designated the "old-for-new" rule should be maintained as a standby mechanism once the ratio reaches zero; whereas the special contributions paid under the "old-for-new" rule should be placed in the reserve fund and may be used for granting scrapping premiums, if intervention in the market proves necessary;